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ABSTRACT In this study, we explore the role of education in explaining the labour
market outcomes for a sample of graduates in medicine. More specifically, the following
research question is answered: To what extent are labour market outcomes of physicians
explained by the skills acquired in education, as indicated in the theory of human capital,
or by competences already present at the start of education, as suggested by the screening
theory? The study uses separate measurements of competence at the start and at the end of
education. Moreover, we use a direct measurement of competence development during
medical education. This enables us to disentangle the effects of the suggested mechanisms.
The results suggest that after graduation human capital factors do not explain subsequent
differences in labour market outcomes. The medical degree seems a sufficient signal of
screening device as such. However, selection processes during education take place on
human capital acquired before and during medical education.
KEY WORDS: Human capital; productivity; labour market entry
Introduction and Problem Statement
The Selection and Allocation Process for Physicians
After medical students have passed their medical qualifying examination (after
the Masters’ programme and two years of clinical clerkships), they face a rather
unique selection and allocation process in the labour market. This process is
different from the processes other academic graduates face because of the typical
features of medical study: it is highly standardized for every student and it aims
to prepare for further specialization into highly professional medical jobs. These
are to be obtained by following further educational trajectories that are combined
with work in practice. Empirical research on the transition from education to the
Correspondence Address: Judith Semeijn, Maastricht University, Faculty of Economics and Business
Administration, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market, PO Box 616, 6200 MD Maas-
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labour market of physicians is scarce. One study suggests that no clear educa-
tional or human capital factors seem to explain the attainment of a specialization
position, or why one candidate is selected over another (Borghans and Ramaek-
ers, 1993). Another indicates that the attainment of a medical assistantship (not in
training) in a hospital, after graduation, will increase the probability of obtaining
a medical specialization position (in training) afterwards (van den Berg et al.,
2002). This suggests a possible human capital or screening explanation. Because
the amount of the working experience as a medical assistant seems to have no
differentiating effect on the probability of becoming a specialist in training, the
authors conclude the effect of having worked as a medical assistant is merely a
signal for employers. It signals the expected productivity in, and/or interests of
the candidates for, a medical career as a specialist. This is in line with screening or
sorting theory (see, for example, Thurow, 1975; Weiss, 1995).
In our view, randomness in selection seems illegitimate without a strong link
with the underlying quality of what has been learnt. It is also at odds with educa-
tional literature concerning the relationship between medical competence and
(better) professional functioning (see, for example, Norcini and Lipner, 2000;
Tamblyn et al., 1998). Specialization positions differ in complexity and training
intensity, and graduates also differ in trainability or learning competences and
acquired medical competences. Although following the same medical course
offers the same minimum quality, there are still differences in the competences
between good and mediocre students. Why then would these differences not
predict the labour market chances of physicians, such as it would be expected to
make a difference for other graduates, from other study fields, as well?
Measurement Problems
A possible reason for the apparent absence of relevant human capital predictors
may be the lack of adequate measures. Trainability or learning competences and
acquired medical competences are rarely measured as such, simply because
measurements for these individual characteristics are scarce in labour market
research (see, for example, Sørenson, 1994).
In educational research, such instruments are not easily available either. Many
studies reveal that the assessment of competences during academic education is
not always in line with the desired competence outcomes for students; examinations
seem to direct the learning behaviour of students, leading sometimes to good
study results (see, for example, Irandoust and Karlsson, 2002), but not always to
rooted (deeply incorporated) knowledge and competence (Verhoeven, 2003). It is
therefore necessary to carefully consider the instruments used for measuring
learning outcomes; whether they really refer to the presence of (development of)
desired competence(s). Otherwise competence is measured that is not desirable
and instruments will not be informative for explaining selection processes on the
labour market, leading to possible wrong conclusions about the value of human
capital or competences learnt in education.
Purpose of the Study
In this study, we want to investigate the role of (medical) education in the selec-
tion and allocation of physicians in the labour market with empirical data
concerning their learning competences and their more study-specific competence
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development. We will do this with a rather unique data set of physicians gradu-
ated at Maastricht University (The Netherlands). These data contain several types
of assessments during the medical study. These types of assessments have differ-
ent measurement properties within the educational context, thereby measuring
different aspects of the medical competence that students have to master at the
end of the programme. In addition, these different types of measurement have
differential effects on the learning behaviour of the students. One type of assess-
ment in particular, the so-called Progress Test, has been revealed to have the
desired effects on learning behaviour in an academic educational context (Verho-
even, 2003). The test measures growth in competence of students in the medical
knowledge domain as defined by the educational end-objectives (van der Vleuten
et al., 1996). It is not possible to prepare oneself specifically for this test, since it
measures the students’ present knowledge of the complete medical domain. In
other words, the test meets our criteria to measure the growth and final level in
the actual acquired medical competences, at least for its knowledge component.
Two other types of assessment, the so-called Block Tests and Skills Tests, are more
traditional instruments in the sense of their measurement properties. They
measure the mastery of the content of certain courses covering well-defined
subdomains of the medical knowledge domain, and the mastery of clinical proce-
dures during diagnosis and medical practice in directly observed simulated situa-
tions, respectively. These tests have course-tailored standards and do not
measure growth in medical expertise components across time. For the so-called
Block Tests, studies have indicated that they are related to different, and perhaps
less desirable, learning style aspects than the Progress Tests (van Berkel et al.,
2003). This is something to keep in mind when analysing the data and interpret-
ing the results. We also include available grade point averages (GPAs) from
secondary school as an indicator of the competence level before the start of medical
study. In this way we are able to measure the already present outcomes of capa-
bilities of people (such as those measured by the GPAs) separately from compe-
tence development in medical education. Both will be related to labour market
outcomes of physicians in terms of the type of medical job they have obtained, a
year and a half after graduation.
The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows. In the next section,
the theoretical background for our analyses will be presented. The third section
addresses the data and the method of research. In the subsequent section 4, the
results of the analyses will be presented. Finally, conclusions and considerations
for future research will be discussed.
Theoretical Background
It goes without saying that having attained a medical degree as such plays an
important role in the selection process. This degree is needed for legal functioning
in the health sector as a physician. Without the medical certificate, no employer,
no hospital or no health organization can hire a candidate as a physician. The
question is, however, what this certificate represents for the employer, and to
what extent other and additional selection criteria play a role in the selection and
allocation process of physicians on the labour market.
In this respect we can distinguish mainly two different perspectives on the role
of education in labour market research. The first perspective points to the rela-
tion between success in education and learning capacities. When physicians enter
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the labour market, their learning process has far from ended. Specialization
programmes, and other medical jobs as well, imply further learning to extend the
already acquired basics of the academic medical programme. It could therefore
be of interest to future employers to select the candidate with the best learning or
training ability. This is especially relevant for graduated physicians, because they
face a rather unique labour market compared with other graduates, with many
further training positions. The candidate with the best learning ability will have
the best chance for succeeding in further specialization and learning will occur at
the smallest costs. In labour market research this line of thought is actually
captured by the Screening or Sorting hypothesis (see, for example, Thurow, 1975;
Spence, 1974). This states that employers use educational screening devices (like
diploma’s or study results) as signals about the underlying learning ability. In
the case of our physicians, the medical degree as such could represent such a
screening device. But one might also think of more differentiating measures,
such as (average) medical study achievements, or GPAs (of secondary school).
The second perspective on the role of education we distinguish pertains to the
fact that individual differences in learning ability lead to individual differences
in the acquisition and level of mastery of specific medical competences. These
latter differences may play a role on their own in the selection and allocation on
the labour market. Specialization tracks and other medical jobs differ in length,
intensity and in the type of (medical) competences required. Therefore, the more
medical competences a graduate possesses, at the end of the academic medical
study, the more attractive this graduate will be. This line of thought is supported
by the Human Capital hypothesis (see, for example, Becker, 1983; McNabb,
1987). This hypothesis states that people acquire skills or competences during
education that are relevant for their future jobs. These skills or competences
make people more productive and thus attractive for the labour market.1
Employers may therefore be interested in indicators of direct productive compe-
tences of physicians.
Measurement Problems with Respect to Selection Criteria
Finding relevant indicators for the role of education for selection and allocation is
rather problematic in labour market research, because the measurements are not
well distinguished in sustaining the different explanations.
One important reason for this is the absence of separate measures for learning
capacities on the one hand and acquired competences in education on the other.
Most indicators for schooling, like ‘years of schooling’ or ‘attained level of educa-
tion’, or even the already mentioned ‘study results’, reflect both the ability to
achieve a certain level (reflecting the amount of learning ability) as well as the
acquisition of certain skills. Although study achievement results may be appealing
for the measurement of competence acquisition during education, the meaning of
most achievement results is not beyond an indication of the performance of a
student on an educational test at a given moment in time, without a longitudinal
perspective on what exactly has been learnt (see, for example, Lindblom-Ylänne
and Lonka, 2001; Baker, 2001). Therefore, study results can reflect both learning
ability and a certain type of actual acquired competences, depending on the type
of test (e.g., skills test, knowledge test).
In addition, the measurement of actual competence acquisition requires a direct
monitoring of the actual learning process during education, thereby requiring
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certain features of the instrument; that is, longitudinal measurement properties
(standardized scale across measurements) and repeated measures. And this type
of data is scarce (Sørensen, 1994).
A third problem is that learning ability and the actual competence develop-
ment during medical education may go hand in hand during the educational
programme. Separate effects on labour market outcomes may then be hard to
determine, due to high correlations between the two. Also multicollinearity may
occur, which can lead to unjust inconsistent or insignificant results—see, for
example, Ethington et al. (2002) for an explanation of the phenomenon; see also
Cawley et al. (2001) for an example of studying separate effects of ‘cognitive abil-
ity’ and ‘education’ on wages. It would require theoretically perfectly separated
instruments for measuring both elements to overcome this problem. Instruments
such as the Intelligence Quotient Score or the Scholastic Aptitude score are used
for measuring learning ability in terms of cognitive aptitudes (see, for example,
Atkinson et al., 1987). However, others argue that ‘learning ability’ should not or
cannot be separated from the specific competence for which it is used (see, for
example, Perkins and Salomon, 1989; Glaser, 1990), which, in fact, implies that
the development of competence during education also captures already present
abilities.
Some Solutions to the Measurement Problems
One solution put forward in this paper to overcome the aforementioned problems
is the use of a specific test, the so-called Progress Test. This test is considered to
measure the growth in cognitive competence (knowledge) concerning the entire
medical domain (van der Vleuten et al., 1996). In the third section (Data and Meth-
odology) this test will be discussed in detail. However, the availability of this
instrument will not guarantee a separate measurement of a specific component in
the competence development process. It may also capture more generic capacities
of competence of people, such as their learning ability to acquire this specific
knowledge.
Therefore, another solution to the difficulties with separate measurements
will be used as well; we will measure the competence level of students at the
start of their medical education and the competence development and compe-
tence level at the end of their education. In this way, the competences already
present before medical education and the competences actually developed in
medical education can be separated. Then, under the restriction that we are
able to avoid multicollinearity, we will be able to test the labour market theo-
retical inferences about the role of education for physicians. The research ques-
tion then is whether medical education really adds labour market important
competences during the educational process (human capital), or whether the
competences already present before or at the start of medical education can
already explain selection and the labour market outcomes (signalling and/or
screening).
Research Model and Hypotheses
For the selection and allocation process in the labour market for physicians, we
argue that two elements can be measured separately: the competences learnt
during medical education (by indicators of competence at the end of the academic
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program; that is, the final Progress Test, the Skills Test score of the fourth year
and the mean Block Test scores of the fourth year), and the level of competence
already present at the start or even before the onset of medical education (by
indicators of competence at the start of the academic program; that is, GPAs, the
first Progress Test in the first year and the mean Block Test scores of the first
year). The relations of the competence levels with labour market outcomes are
presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Model of possible effects of competence levels at different times in the educational process on labour market outcomes for physiciansThe existence of a possible positive relation 1 is not exclusive for one of both
theoretical assumptions. However, when medical education is merely important
for its reflection of a desired competence level already present before the actual
medical training takes place (as can be explained by the screening thought), indi-
cators of competence levels at the start of the medical programme must have an
effect on labour market outcomes (relation 3). It is probable, however, that the
competence level at the start of medical education will affect the competence
development and subsequently the acquired level of competence at the end of
medical education (relation 1, relation 2). Therefore, when the medical
programme itself adds competences relevant for work (such as can be explained
by human capital theory), the acquired competence level at the end of education
must be of relevance (relation 2), even after controlling for the effects of previous
competence levels. It may also be possible that both the competence level at the
start as well as the competence level at the end of medical education will have
independent effects on labour market outcomes, resulting in positive relations 2
and 3, after controlling for relation 1.
In summary, the following relations will be tested: 
a. Indicators of competence at the end of the medical study (acquired compe-
tence) affect individual labour market outcomes (human capital, relation 2,
controlled for relation 1);
b. Indicators of competence at the start of the study affect labour market
outcomes, even after controlling for the effects of end-level indicators (screen-
ing argument, relation 3, and relations 1 through 2).
The relation between the start-level indicators of competence and the end-level
indicators of competence (relation 1 in the research model) will be tested
independently and explicitly as well, although this is not the main theoretical
focus of this paper. Therefore the results of this analysis will be dealt with in
Appendix 4.
In the following section, the data and methodology for testing the research
model will be outlined.
Indicators of competence
level at the start of medical
education, i.e. GPA's, first
Progress Test scores and
mean Block Test scores in
the first year
Labour market
outcomes a year
and a half after
graduation; type of
medical job
Indicators of competence level at the end of
medical education, i.e. final Progress Test
scores, Skills Test scores and mean Block
Test scores of the fourth year
3. 
2. 1.
Figure 1. Model of possible effects of competence levels at different times in the educational process 
on labour market outcomes for physicians
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Data and Methodology
Subjects
The research population consists of medical students of Maastricht University,
who started their medical study in 1989–1991. The students will be followed
during their educational process and during their labour market entry, which
may take different amounts of time (in education) and different routes (on the
labour market). This implies that labour market entry years are more diverse than
study entry years. Hence, we will control for labour market entry year and study
length in the analyses.
Instruments for Competence Measurement
Indicators of the competence level at the start of the medical programme are: 
● GPAs at the end of secondary education;
● First Progress Test score in the first year of study; and
● Mean Block Test scores in the first year.
Indicators of the competence level at the end of the medical programme are: 
● Final Progress Test score in the fourth year of study;
● Mean Block Test scores in the fourth year; and
● Skills Test score in the fourth year.
Multiple indicators are used, because of their differentiated measurement proper-
ties and their possibly different importance in measuring what employers may be
interested in (such as specific medical skills, specific medical knowledge, or a
more generic indication of the learning capacity of graduates). The data will be
considered for multicollinearity.
Although the medical study officially takes six years, the final two years are
reserved for the so-called clinical clerkships. During these clerkships, Progress Tests
are administered as well, although the scores on this test in the fifth and sixth years
are biased in two ways. In the first place the learning environment has extremely
changed, from a highly structured standardized educational programme to one of
rather individualized working and learning in practice. This can affect the scores
on the tests. Second, not every student has to pass these last tests for graduation,
so only the less well scoring students will have to do these last tests. Block Tests
(i.e., knowledge tests covering the contents of separate courses) are not used during
the clerkships period, and a Skills Test is administered in the sixth year, although
not at the end of the year, so students are still in the middle of their individual learn-
ing trajectories, which can cause biased scores. Alternative assessments concerning
the competence development of students during the clerkships, such as global clinical
performance ratings, seem however (also) to suffer from bias (see, for example,
Williams et al., 2003) and are only sufficiently reliable when many repeated ratings
(9–12) are gathered, while in practice so many ratings are seldom available. This is
also the case for our subjects. For the purpose of our study we therefore consider
the final Progress Test score in the fourth year as the best available end-level
indicator of competence developed in education, together with the fourth-year
Skills Test score, and the available mean Block Test scores of the fourth year.
The competence indicators have the following features.
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Progress Test scores.  These are gathered during the medical programme four times
a year and capture the growth in specific medical competence (knowledge aspect)
during the years of study, because each test covers the total relevant medical
knowledge domain. The total score on the test is expressed as a percentage of the
correct answers minus the incorrect answers. The Progress Test scores meet to a
large extent the measurement criteria as proposed by Sørensen (1994) to be able to
measure actual competence development in education. For detailed information
about the Progress Test, its validity and reliability for our measurement purpose,
and relevant references, refer to Appendix 1.
Block Test scores.   These are gathered six times a year and cover only course-
related subdomains of medical expertise. It is basically a knowledge test of about
150 items that is administered after every block period (curriculum unit or course)
of six weeks during the doctoral phase (the four-year Masters’ phase). It covers
the contents of the course and tests the mastery of end-objectives of the course on
a percentage scale. Therefore these tests give no information on the general
growth in medical competence. They reflect whether the student has passed the
course successfully. We will use the mean Block Test scores of the first year and
the mean scores of the fourth year as indicators of competence at the start and at
the end of medical education, respectively.
Skills Test scores.   These are gathered only once a year during the medical
programme. They are aimed at testing mastery of clinical procedural skills
through direct observation of students carrying out these skills across a number of
simulated clinical situations. Trained examiners use checklists to score perfor-
mance. Percentage scores reflect the amount of well-performed tasks as registered.
The test covers an increasing amount of clinical skills every year, in line with the
skills students are trained for.
We use the Skills tests scores of the fourth year of the medical programme as an
indicator of the end-level competence of students. The reason we make no use of
the first-year scores for an indication of start-level competence is that the test is
administered at the end of the first study year and therefore probably biased by
learning effects of a complete year of study.
Grade Point Averages.   The GPAs (mean final examination scores of secondary
education) are a highly standardized measure in The Netherlands, expressed on a
scale from 1 to 10. They determine whether the student has successfully passed the
secondary school (scores 5.5–10) or not (scores 1–5.4) and therefore reflect the
attained school success of the graduates before entering the medical programme.
In our sample, only scores between 5.5 and 10 are possibly present, since not
having passed the final examination will not allow one to enter medical education.
When you have passed the final examination, students for medicine are
selected on their GPAs. However, in The Netherlands this did not mean you had
no chance to enter the programme when you were not scoring very high in our
research sample (students starting in 1989–1991): students were grouped based
on ranges of GPA scores. Only a certain percentage of each group was allowed to
enter, which was a larger percentage for groups with higher scores. The selection
of students for these percentages was at random. When you were part of the
group with the highest scores, your individual chance to enter the programme
was higher than for lower scoring students. We use GPAs as an indicator of the
competence level at the start of medical education.
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Instrument for the Measurement of Labour Market Outcomes
Labour market information is gathered by a labour market survey including our
subjects who started their medical study in 1989–1991. This labour market survey
is conducted every year by the Research Centre of Education and the Labour
Market (Dutch short-cut ROA) and gathers labour market information, as well as
educational evaluative data, from graduates one and a half years after gradua-
tion. The graduation cohorts of 1996–2000 (years of labour market entry) are
included to obtain our research sample of about 300 physicians for whom data for
all our educational variables (competence levels at the start and at the end of
medical education) and our labour market outcome variables in terms of obtained
position are available.
Specifically, the following labour market indicators are used from the labour
market survey, pertaining to job chances and the quality of the job (van der
Velden and Wieling, 1994): 
● Having a physicians’ job (dummy variable).
● Having a specialization position (dummy variable).
● Category of common types of jobs/positions; in training for social medicine
jobs2 (1),
● for general practitioner (2), or for a hospital specialization (3), resident not in
training
● (4) and PhD students (5).
● Type of specialization ordered by required training period, reflecting further
investment in human capital and thereby expected lifetime income; in train-
ing for social medicine jobs (1), for general practitioner (2), or for a hospital
specialization (3).
For further argument on the use of these labour market indicators, see Appendix
2. Note that the traditional income indicator has not been used for physicians a
year and a half after graduation. Although information on income is available for
most subjects in our sample, wages are particularly low for graduates in training
for further specialization (i.e., for the more successful graduates), whereas they
are relatively high for non-specialization positions. Income during the transition
phase would therefore reflect a wrong indicator of professional success.
Control Variables
In addition, personal data are included in the analyses as relevant control vari-
ables. These are gender and age. After graduation, mostly women are interested in
part-time work. Possibilities for part-time work are largest in social medicine
positions, even during the training period. Age may play a role because it reflects
experience gained in earlier work and life (human capital argument). On the other
hand, age may also have a negative effect, because the returns on investments
become relatively low for a candidate (human capital argument), and/or a candi-
date may become less flexible with age, which can interfere with the demanding
learning process in specialization (selection argument). Socialization processes
are important learning sources for physicians (Slotnick, 2001). The (self-)selection
on age fits this context. In all, the age effect will depend on the range in ages
among the research subjects. Study length (in months net) is a relevant control
458 J. Semejin et al.
variable, because the amount of time spent in the educational process diverges
between students and can bias their scores on competence indicators in the
programme. As a final control variable, year of entry in the labour market will be
used (1996–2000), to control for fluctuations in the labour market demand of
physicians for specific (specialization) jobs.
Method of Analysis
We will test the effects of education on the different labour market outcomes in
different (sub)models. In the first model, we will estimate the effects of the
competence level at the start of the medical education. In the second model,
the effect of the competences at the end of medical education will be tested. In the
third and final model, both indicators of competence level at the start of as well as
indicators of competence level at the end of medical education are included, to
measure their combined effects. In all three models we control for age, gender,
study length and year of entry in the labour market. For the different labour
market indicators, binary logistic regression, multi-nominal logistic regression
and ordinal regression analyses are used.
Before conducting the labour market analyses, the data will be controlled for
multicollinearity and selection bias in the research subjects’ competence scores. We
realize there are still many individual and job heterogeneities not being controlled
for in the study. Nevertheless, we like to explore the predictive value of the
research model as presented, because of its rather unique nature as available. In so
far a selection bias is present in the scores on the competence indicators used, this
bias is analysed on different moments during the educational and labour market
entry process. The next section presents the results of our multicollinearity and
selection analyses, and of the model estimates.
Results
Descriptives for all Variables
Descriptive results of all variables used in the analyses and Pearson’s correlations
are presented in Table 1.
All study results variables in Table 1 reflect percentile scores of correct or
correct-minus-incorrect answers. However, the GPAs are on a scale from 1 to 10
and, because all students have passed the examination, only scores from 6 to 10 are
present in our sample. Correlations between study variables are significantly posi-
tive. The largest correlation is between the final Progress Test and the mean Block
Test score of the fourth year for the end-level indicators, even larger than the
considerable correlations between the first and fourth year Block Test scores, and
between the GPAs and the mean first year Block Test scores. This suggests the
measurement of common elements at both the start and end of education by differ-
ent knowledge testing instruments. Because the correlations are considerably high
(ranging from 0.515 to 0.574), we consider the presence of multicollinearity between
the different instruments at the start and at the end of education before conducting
further analyses. We do this by comparing the effects of the different instruments
together and separately on labour market outcomes, as well as in different
combinations (pairs of predictors). It appears that the effects of the Mean Block
Test scores, both at the start and at the end of education, seem to cause the largest
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differences in parameter estimates (β values and standard errors), when including
more predictors in the models. These differences appear to be larger than may be
expected based on the separate effects of the different instruments. Without
including the Mean Block Test scores, the possible problem of multicollinearity
seems omitted. We therefore decided to leave the Mean Block Test scores out of
further analysis.3
The other relevant problem for the interpretation of our results refers to selec-
tion bias affecting the competence levels. Selection processes may bias the effects
of competence indicators on the acquisition of competence in academic education,
graduation, and responding to the labour market survey. Although internal
publications indicate that drop-out (selection bias) among students in medicine is
often due to other (more personal) factors than differences in competence levels
(van Luijk et al., 1990; Perquin, 1999), we like to empirically consider the possible
selectivity sources in our analyses. We do this by conducting sequential logistic
regression analyses with our competence indicators for three relevant selection
moments; that is, the availability of our end-level competence indicators for the
students who started the medical study in the years 1989–1991, graduation before
the year 2001 (which implies a maximum of 11 years of study for students entered
in 1989), and response to the labour market survey. The results of these sequential
analyses and the differences in the means of the competence level indicators are
presented in Table I in Appendix 3. They reveal that for all our competence
instruments used, the subjects in our remaining research sample have already
significantly higher scores due to selection processes during education, gradua-
tion before the year 2001, and/or responding to the labour market survey. We
should take this into account when interpreting the results of our further analy-
ses; that is, the effects of the scores on our instruments on labour market outcomes
for physicians. It means, generally speaking, that the variation between the
subjects in our remaining study sample has already become smaller, which
restricts the chances to find effects of test results. We must therefore be aware of
an underestimation of the effects of test results, implying an underestimation of
the effects of acquired human capital.
Effects of Levels of Competence on Obtaining a Physicians’ Job
Based on Table 1, we can argue that almost all graduates have obtained a physi-
cians’ job a year and a half after graduation (almost 98.5%). This is considered and
confirmed for all available (non-matching) cases in the labour market survey data
as well. It is therefore almost superfluous to conduct a logistic regression for this
indicator, because almost no variation is present. The binary logistic regression
analyses indeed confirm this expectation, by revealing no effects of any of the
(competence) variables included in the analyses. The results are presented in
Table 2. As can be seen from the table, only positive effects of year of entry (1998)
in the labour market appear. So far, the medical study seems to guarantee a medi-
cal job after graduation.
Effects of Competence Levels on Obtaining a Specialization Position
For our second labour market indicator, obtaining a specialization position
(dummy), it appears from Table 1 that 42% of those who work as a physician
indeed have obtained a specialization. With a binary logistic regression we
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measure the effects of competence indicators at the start of and at the end of
medical education on having acquired a specialization position. The results of the
analyses are presented in Table 3.
The results show no effects for any of the included competence indicators. The
findings suggest there are no explaining effects of competence levels on the
chances for obtaining a specialization as such. Only a slightly significant negative
effect of a longer study duration is found in the first model, but it disappears
again when the end-level competence indicators are included. Therefore we may
conclude that the results so far suggest evidence for a screening argument; the
medical degree as such is sufficient for a relevant job and obtaining a specializa-
tion position is merely a matter of luck (or more probably, other selection criteria
not included in our analyses) afterwards.
However, the selection bias in our data indicates a human capital argument
cannot be excluded yet. And in addition, heterogeneity can be assumed to be
present both in specialization positions and in non-specialization positions (see
Table 2. Regression estimates of the effects of competence levels at the start and 
at the end of medical education on having a physicians’ job a year and a half after 
graduation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B
Standard 
error B
Standard 
error B
Standard 
error
Constant −9.832 11.811 −6.785 9.836 −13.513 12.580
Competence level at start of medical 
education
GPAs 0.736 0.646 0.783 0.683
First Progress Test score first year −0.291 0.707 −0.422 0.746
Competence level at end of medical 
education
Final Progress Test fourth year 0.038 0.590 0.666
Skills Test score fourth year 0.612 0.529 0.609
Control variables
Male 0.517 1.154 0.912 1.251 0.879 1.235
Age 0.475 0.483 0.305 0.387 0.601 0.512
Study length in months net −0.012 0.060 0.006 0.060 −0.013 0.063
Year of entry 1996 9.839 56.470 10.021 56.595 10.155 55.123
Year of entry 1997 1.453 1.196 1.382 1.203 1.804 1.211
Year of entry 1998 2.352* 1.336 2.248* 1.332 2.784* 1.487
Year of entry 1999 10.266 52.499 9.992 53.343 10.857 48.794
Model statistics
Number of cases (n) 305 305 305
Model chi-square 10.759 10.583 12.157
Degrees of freedom 9 9 11
p 0.293 0.305 0.352
Notes: Standardized values are used for all competence indicator variables. Year of entry 2000 is the
reference category for the ‘year of entry’ control variables.
* Significant at the 0.1 level.
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Appendix 2 for argument). Therefore we continue with considering the
effects of the more qualifying and screening role of education on the chances to
obtain different types of jobs (specialization positions and non-specialization
positions).
Effects of Competence Levels on Obtaining Different Types of Physicians’ Jobs
We conduct multi-nominal regression analyses (MNRA) for the largest categories
of jobs in the sample, consisting of residents not in training, medical PhD
students, residents in training for hospital specializations, general practitioners in
training (GPs in training), and physicians in training for specializations in social
medicine. Table 4 presents the results.
As Table 4 indicates, we took the hospital specialization positions as the refer-
ence category. The following effects were found. The negative effect of being male
for the social medicine category compared with the hospital specialists in training
Table 3. Regression estimates of the effects of competence levels at the start and 
at the end of medical education on having a specialization position a year and a 
half after graduation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B
Standard 
error B
Standard 
error B
Standard 
error
Constant −0.661 1.833 −1.388 1.784 −1.121 1.897
Competence level at start of medical 
education
GPAs 0.008 0.121 −0.009 0.130
First Progress Test score of first year 0.095 0.199 0.090 0.200
Competence level at end of medical 
education
Final Progress Test fourth year −0.026 0.130 −0.025 0.137
Skills Test score fourth year 0.148 0.135 0.146 0.137
Control variables
Male −0.320 0.252 −0.280 0.256 −0.274 0.257
Age 0.059 0.059 0.074 0.055 0.066 0.059
Study length in months net −0.023* 0.012 −0.020 0.013 −0.020 0.013
Year of entry 1996 0.763 0.556 0.751 0.553 0.783 0.559
Year of entry 1997 0.941* 0.539 0.953* 0.540 0.941* 0.542
Year of entry 1998 0.955* 0.532 0.986* 0.534 0.979* 0.535
Year of entry 1999 0.756 0.544 0.774 0.544 0.766 0.546
Model Statistics
Number of cases (n) 301 301 301
Model chi-square 9.349 10.315 10.516
Degrees of freedom 9 9 11
p 0.406 0.3926 0.485
Notes: Standardized values are used for all competence indicator variables. Year of entry 2000 is the
reference category for the ‘year of entry’ control variables.
* Significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level.
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is consistent in all three models; being female enhances your chance to obtain a
training position in social medicine after graduation considerably.
In the second model, the end-level competence indicators are tested; negative
effects are found for the final Progress Test score for physicians in a training posi-
tion for social medicine (compared with the hospital specialists in training). A one
standard deviation higher score on the final Progress Test leads to significant
negative effects on the odds of obtaining a training position in social medicine,
compared with becoming a hospital specialist in training, of 0.55, implying a
decrease of 45% in the odds ratio. This is the expected change, all other variables
remaining constant. In terms of what this decrease will mean for one’s chance to
obtain a training position in social medicine, the odds ratio can be written as the
relative chance to obtain this type of job (sm), compared with a hospital special-
ization in training job (hs), and one can calculate the differences in the chance for
different values of the separate (relevant) variables, by considering a reference
person (e.g., a female with mean age, with mean scores on the competence
indicators, entered in the labour market in the reference year 2000).
These differences in the chance to obtain a training position in social medicine
are presented in Table 5 based on our reference person. We include the relevant
effects of gender and the final Progress Test score from the second model of our
MNRA, to show their separate effects on the chance, the other variables remaining
constant.
Returning to Table 4, in the third model of our MNRA, including both start-
level and end-level competence indicators, no effects of any of the competence
indicators are left. Only the already mentioned effect of gender and an effect of
labour market entry year (1997) remain present. Apparently, in the end, the
selection of candidates for different physicians’ jobs seems not to be regulated
by their competence levels very much, at least not in our research sample.
Although the results of our MNRA already ‘predict’ the outcomes of our final
analysis, in which we intend to concentrate on the three specific medical special-
ization (training) positions, we conduct this analysis as planned.
We order the three specialization positions according to the duration of their
training periods, reflecting the opportunity to obtain a higher expected lifetime
income (see also Appendix 2).
Table 5. Changes in chance to obtain a training position in social medicine (sm) 
compared with a hospital specialization in training position (hs)
Chance to obtain sm versus hs, 
model 2 of the MNRA
Chance for reference person 6%
Changes in chance for relevant predictors
Gender
Female (reference)
Male −5%
fPTscore fourth year
0 (standardized mean)
1 (+ one standard deviation) −2%
Notes: The reference person has the mean age, is female, has the mean competence indicator scores and
entered the labour market in 2000 (reference category). fPTscore = final Progress Test score.
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Effects of Competence Levels on Three Types of Specialization Positions (Ordered)
With ordinal regression analyses we test the effects of start-level and end-level
competence on the acquisition of a specialization position of a longer duration,
controlled for gender, age, and relevant years of entry in the labour market again.
In this respect, the social medicine in training category is considered the lowest and
the hospital specializations (residency positions in training) the highest category,
while general practitioners’ training lies in between. Table 6 presents the results.
As can be seen from Table 6, the ordinal regression model is estimated as a
probit-linked threshold model with three categories. They represent the
distances between ordered outcomes for which the exact distances between the
categories is unknown, but for which the ordering represents an underlying
continuous variable, such as in our study the amount of investment in training (see
also Long, 1997; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). The results can be interpreted as
follows: being a male enlarges the chances for specialization positions of a
longer duration in all models. The effects are estimated as a part of the distance
between the categories (threshold 2 – threshold 1), which is −2.653 – (−1.213) = −
1.440 in the first model. When the effect of being male is 0.751, this is more than
one-half of the distance of 1.440. This may be interpreted as the effect of being
male on the job outcome being, on average, more than one-half a higher ranked
job category. In the second and third models the effect of gender is related to
almost one-half of a category higher outcome. It must be noted that the chance
to obtain a GP in training position is the highest in general. With respect to the
start-level competence indicators, no effects are found. For the end-level indica-
tors, a positive effect is found for the final Progress Test score. Its effect expects
the chance to obtain a ‘higher’ position to increase for the distance of about only
one-seventh of a category, when scoring one standard deviation higher on the
test. A higher age has a small negative effect to obtain a higher position in the
ranked ordering of specialization positions. However, in the third and final
model, only the effect of being a male remains present, and the other effects
disappear. Thus, even when ordering only the types of specializations, no real
differentiation of the candidates based on their competence levels explains their
allocation over the different positions. Gender is the most important factor in
explaining the differences.
Summary of Results
Overall, the effects in our regression analyses seem to suggest marginal roles of
differential test results in medical education. Although the start-level indicators
of competence predict levels of competence at the end of education (as
confirmed in the analysis in Appendix 4), they reveal no further explaining
effects for labour market outcomes, not even after controlling for the end-level
indicators of competence (relation b; i.e., our screening argument cannot be
confirmed). From the end-level indicators in our models, the final Progress Test
scores seem to have some effects (relation a; i.e., the human capital argument is
partly confirmed), but when controlling for the start-level indicators of compe-
tence again, these effects disappear (relation a is not fully confirmed). These are
remarkable findings, merely suggesting credit for the signalling value for the
medical degree as such. However, considering the already higher levels in
scores on all competence indicators for the research subjects, due to selective
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processes, a more differentiated approach in interpreting the results is needed.
Because both levels of competence at the start and at the end of education are
higher for the research sample that remains available for our labour market
analyses, it cannot be denied that education both screens students on their
already present competence (students dropping out from the programme have
lower mean scores for GPAs), as well as that education equips students with
relevant knowledge that affects their labour market entry (the final Progress Test
reveals effects in the analyses, although the remaining research sample has
Table 6. Estimates of the effects of competence levels at the start of and at the 
end of medical education on obtaining a higher ranked specialization position 
based on required further training investment (reflecting expected lifetime 
income)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Estimate
Standard 
error Estimate
Standard 
error Estimate
Standard 
error
Thresholdsa
General practitioner −2.653* 1.566 −3.101* 1.611 −2.906* 1.709
Hospital specialization −1.213 1.554 −1.659 1.597 −1.450 1.696
Competence level at start of 
education
GPAs 0.189 0.116 0.166 0.122
First Progress Test score first 
year
−0.074 0.165 −0.073 0.166
Competence level at end of 
education
Final Progress Test score in 
fourth year
0.207* 0.120 0.173 0.123
Final Skills Test score of 
fourth year
−0.060 0.124 −0.091 0.126
Control variables
Male 0.751*** 0.249 0.661*** 0.250 0.711*** 0.254
Age −0.053 0.040 −0.071* 0.038 −0.062 0.042
Study length in months net −0.002 0.011 −0.000 0.012 −0.001 0.012
Year of labour market entry 
1996
−0.520 0.530 −0.508 0.528 −0.599 0.534
Year of entry 1997 0.024 0.544 −0.003 0.522 −0.048 0.549
Year of entry 1998 −0.459 0.517 −0.497 0.507 −0.549 0.523
Year of entry 1999 −0.302 0.549 −0.322 0.544 −0.358 0.552
Model statistics
Number of cases (n) 114 114 114
−2 log likelihood 218.058 217.794 215.813
Model chi-square 16.046 16.309 18.290
Degrees of freedom 9 9 11
p 0.066 0.061 0.075
Link: probit
Notes: Standardized values are used for all competence indicator variables. Year of entry 2000 is the
reference category for the ‘year of entry’ control variables.
a The reference category is social medicine.
* Significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, and *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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already higher scores). This is an indication that the labour market outcomes for
physicians are merely based on a guaranteed minimum of their competence
levels, without further differentiation between good and mediocre students after
graduation. In this respect, it is in fact remarkable that we still find effects of the
final Progress Test scores for our sample, indicating that higher final Progress
Test scores increase one’s chance to obtain a higher ranked specialization
position, and differentiating the social medicine in training category from other
job categories. The fact that no effects are found for the start-level competence
indicators, nor for the end-level indicators after controlling for the start-level
indicators, may well be explained in light of the selection effects instead of being
insignificant in themselves.
In the final section of this paper, conclusions will be drawn from the results and
considerations for future research will be presented.
Conclusion and Discussion
What We Did
In this paper, an empirical study has been conducted into the role of medical educa-
tion for the selection and allocation on the labour market for physicians, a year and
a half after graduation. For this purpose, we measured whether medical education
really adds to the human capital or competences of students (Sørensen, 1994). This
type of measurement is scarce in labour market research, but we had such a
measurement available in the unique form of Progress Test scores of medical
students during their medical programme (van der Vleuten et al., 1996). However,
to separate the effects of actual acquired competence from more general and
already present capacities of physicians, we considered the effects of competence
levels for physicians at the start and at the end of their medical study separately
and controlled for multicollinearity and selection bias in our data. Successful labour
market outcomes have been defined in terms of the chances to obtain a physicians’
job, a specialization position, for obtaining a certain type of medical job, and for the
type of specialization position obtained (subsample), ordered by training duration,
reflecting further investment in human capital and the expected lifetime income.
What We Found
The results indicate that almost 98.5% of the physicians in our research sample
have found a relevant job; the medical degree therefore seems to ‘guarantee’ the
allocation to relevant medical jobs, which is also confirmed by logistic regression
analyses, in which no effects of competence indicators appear. However, instead
of being irrelevant, the required levels of competences may be of a guaranteed
minimum, as illustrated by the selection bias towards higher scores in our
research sample, and therefore not visible in a rather undifferentiated outcome.
For the chances to obtain a specialization position as such, no effects have been
found for competence levels either. This is in line with earlier findings (see, for exam-
ple, Borghans and Ramaekers, 1993) and may be due to the unimportance of differ-
ences in competence levels of candidates again, but can also be explained by a
heterogeneous composition of both specialization and non-specialization positions.
Distinguishing the different types of jobs physicians can obtain, and analysing
whether competence levels have differentiating value for obtaining these jobs,
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reveals some more information. For the social medicine category it can be said that
the positive effect of being female is most profound and characteristic, compared
with hospital specialization positions. The question is, however, to what extent the
preferences of women as a group for social medicine are the underlying reason for
the gender effect, or whether selection processes and structural constraints for
different job categories (such as some hospital specializations) are the reason (see,
for example, Gjerberg, 2002).
However, controlled for gender, age, study length, and year of entry in the
labour market, the actual acquired competence in education seems to differentiate
the social medicine in training positions from the hospital specialists in training,
and therefore in fact from the GPs in training, the residents not in training, and
PhDs as well.
In all, after having passed the final medical qualifying examination, compe-
tence levels as measured in this study seem not to play an important role in the
selection and allocation of physicians on the labour market. The same accounts
for the findings of our final analysis, in which three specific medical training
positions have been considered separately, by ordering them according to their
training period, also reflecting expected life-time income.
The measurement properties of the Progress Test seem, however, to reveal
more predictive information than the Skills Test, possibly related to the different
aspects of competence that are measured by these different tests. It is suggested
that scoring higher on the Progress Test is related to learning or study style
aspects of students that are considered to be desirable for academic students (see,
for example, van Berkel et al., 1995; Verhoeven, 2003).
Much effort is currently put in research into the relationships between (cogni-
tive) ability, personality, learning style and work performance (see, for example,
Furnham et al., 1999; Austin et al., 2002; Zhang, 2003) to detect the relevant aspects
and their dynamic behaviour. To draw more conclusions in this respect, we
would need to extent the study with measurements of generic competences, such
as learning style data.
What We Conclude
Overall, our results indicate the importance of having attained the medical degree
as such for selection and allocation of physicians on the labour market, without
further differentiation in educational performance. Selection of students takes
already place during the medical programme. Therefore the more qualifying and
screening role of medical education seems merely of importance to guarantee a
minimum quality of the physicians before entering the labour market. However,
taking the already higher scores on both start-level and end-level competence
indicators for the responding subjects on the labour market survey into account,
this conclusion must be handled with care; these (already) higher scores suggest
that the importance of differences in competence is probably not visible in our
analyses, because the subjects who did not return the labour market survey
scored lower on these competence indicators, on average.
Shortcomings and Avenues for Future Research
To find out whether our findings are possibly underestimations of the effects of
educational human capital, the labour market information of the non-responders
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should be recovered otherwise. More groups of medical students should be
followed during their educational process and labour market entry as well, to
enlarge the sample. Since we only include short-term labour market outcomes, an
important question is what effects competence indicators in medical education
will have on the longer-term labour market outcomes of physicians. Will short-
term effects continue to exist, or will there be different outcomes with respect to
the value of education? What other factors are of importance for the allocation
and selection after medical education, and how do these relate to possible self-
selection of students? Future research into longer-term labour market outcomes is
also an interesting and necessary road to follow, considering the changing career
paths of physicians (Goldacre and Lambert, 2000). And, since criteria for labour
market success may also be linked to the quality of the performance of medical
doctors in their work, this would be another or related route for future research.
The role of Progress Test scores in measuring acquired competence during
education and its predictive value for labour market outcome indicators should
be further tested. What is the relation with generic skills, such as learning styles?
What does it mean for later labour market functioning? What is the predictive
value of the Progress Test for later clinical performances of doctors?
Final Conclusion
For now we end with the notion that a first attempt has been made to empirically
separate the possible effects of education on labour market outcomes, as Søren-
son (1994) already requested. The availability of the unique Progress Test
measurements, in combination with the separate indications of the start-level and
end-level competence of students in their study, informed us fairly well about
what role this academic study plays in the first selection and allocation of
physicians on the labour market. In so doing, a step forward has been made to
develop a theory concerning the role of education for labour market outcomes,
not only for physicians but for other graduates as well.
Notes
1. Apart from the purely selective criteria from the view of the employer, individual preferences
with respect to work and the individuals’ self-knowledge of medical and other work-related
competences will lead to a certain amount of self-selection of candidates for specialization tracks
or other medical jobs.
2. Social medicine in The Netherlands includes occupational (and insurance) medicine on the one
hand, and public health (including a.o. mother-and-child care, sports medicine and epidemiology)
on the other.
3. The mean Block Test scores did not reveal significant effects on labour market outcomes.
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Appendix 1 
The value of Progress Test scores in measuring actual learning accumulation in 
relevant competences in medical education
The Progress Test in medical education can best be conceived of as a final exam-
ination: a comprehensive examination reflecting the (cognitive) end-objectives of
the curriculum (van der Vleuten et al., 1996). We now literally recall a part of the
text in this article by van der Vleuten et al. (1996): “Each Progress Test consists
of approximately 250 (multiple) true/false questions stratified in categories
based on the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). It samples knowl-
edge across all disciplines and content areas in medicine relevant for the medical
degree. Four times per year the progress test is given to all students in the
curriculum, regardless of their class. For each occasion a newly constructed
version is prepared. A single test question may be answered with either true or
false, or with an ‘I do not know’ option (the question mark). The latter option is
not penalized or rewarded. A correct answer is rewarded with one mark while
an incorrect answer is given a negative mark. To discourage guessing a total test
score is expressed as the number of correct answers minus the number of incor-
rect answers. To allow comparison across tests, scores are expressed on a
percentage scale. The freshmen year students are not able to answer as many
questions as the second-year students, who are not able to answer as many as
the third-year students and so on…”
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Measurement with the Progress Test reveals satisfactory reliability coefficients
(across years usually alphas above 0.95, within years alphas between 0.70-0.80)
and test construction is highly standardized. Test difficulty variations remain
present though. Validity in measuring the development in relevant medical
competence as an indicator for the actual learning process that takes place in
education seems although satisfactory, as we argue as follows: The measurement
is congruent with the educational findings with respect to competence develop-
ment of medical students and physicians; the knowledge component is crucial for
this process. The development of medical expertise is considered the same as
learning to solve problems within the medical knowledge domain (Boshuizen &
Schmidt, 2000). However, the knowledge domain has to be solid enough to facili-
tate the expertise development process. This implies the explicit importance of
knowledge and the acquisition of this knowledge during education. In fact, two
types of knowledge are relevant for physicians; conceptual and experiential
knowledge (Schmidt et al., 1990). The conceptual type is merely acquired during
formal education, and experiential knowledge is acquired based on the concep-
tual knowledge, during work (Norman, 1988).
Based on the findings concerning medical knowledge, we assume the specific
conceptual knowledge acquisition in education to be of major importance to the
competence development process in education we like to measure. We assume
the growth in conceptual medical knowledge to be captured and monitored satis-
factory with the ‘Progress Test’.
To underline the value of the final Progress Test scores of the fourth year in
measuring the attained level of medical competence and the difference in this
respect with the more traditional study results in our sample, we refer to figure 1-3.
Figure 1: grow curve mean sample scores year 1-4 for Progress tests2 Bl ck Test3 Skills tsThe Progress test scores from our sample reveal comparable findings with
respect to growth curves on the cohort level, such as presented in the study of van
der Vleuten et al. (1996). In addition, no bias was found in growth between the
cases in our research sample (restricted by the availability of relevant labour
market information) and our total data set of students that had taken the Progress
tests during the relevant cohort periods.
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Figure 1. grow curve mean sample scores year 1-4 for Progress tests
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Appendix 2 
Argumentation for indicators of labour market success for physicians
Labour market outcomes for individuals can be considered in terms of chances
for a job and the quality of the job (van der Velden & Wieling, 1994; Semeijn &
van der Velden, 2002). However, for physicians these labour market outcome
indicators do not reveal as much information as for other graduates, such as
Block Tests
Mean % correct minus false answers
46
44
42
40
38M
ea
n
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year
Figure 2. grow curve mean sample scores year 1-4 for Block Tests
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Figure 3. grow curve mean sample scores year 1-4 for Skills Tests
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economists. Their chances of obtaining a medical job are extremely high because
only physicians can attain these jobs and labour market demand and supply are
highly controlled by institutional regulations, for example by a maximum
number of specialists that is allowed to be trained, and the numeri fixi for the
number of students that is allowed to start the medical academic program in the
first place. The salaries in specialisation positions are highly regulated as well,
and therefore not very informative either. Moreover, wages are lowest for gradu-
ates that have attained a training position for further specialisation and higher for
those who are not in training. As obtaining a training position is considered an
indicator of professional success, wages shortly after graduation are not a good
indicator of labour market success. The chances for attaining a specialisation posi-
tion seem relevant, because it seems more successful to obtain a specialisation
position faster. However, it can be a well-considered choice to gain medical expe-
rience in a non-specialisation position first, and wait for a better or more
preferred specialisation position a little later in the career. This leads to the situa-
tion that both physicians in specialisation and non-specialisation positions, a year
and a half after graduation, constitute heterogeneous groups. This heterogeneity
may be a reason why earlier research did not find any further explaining factors
for the chances to obtain a specialisation position than the medical degree as such.
This means that the group who did not yet obtain a specialisation position rather
shortly after graduation, consists both of graduates who are not able to get or
want such a position and of graduates who are well qualified and are still waiting
in the queue. Similarly, the group of specialists in training is heterogeneous as
well, consisting of positions that require extensive training in highly specialized
medical area’s (hospital specialisations) and positions that require much less
further training within a broader field of practice (social medicine). Since both
specialisation and non-specialisation positions are heterogeneous, we will distin-
guish the most important types of specialisation and non-specialisation positions
as a relevant labour market outcome in terms of the type of job physicians obtain.
And, of course, we will first test our assumption with respect to the attainment of
a specialisation position as such.
In addition, specialisation positions themselves can be ranked according to the
duration of the training period. Hospital specialisations take usually 5 to 7 years
of training, while general practitioners’ training takes 3 years, and the social
medicine specialisations 2-2,5 years. In economic terms, the highest specialisation
type in ranking requires the largest investment in human capital and leads to the
largest returns in terms of lifetime income. It is common knowledge that hospital
specialists will earn the most, during their entire career, whereas general practi-
tioners earn much less, and social physicians will earn the least, after they have
completed training. The duration of the training periods therefore reflects the
individuals’ opportunity to obtain a higher lifetime income. Although the stabil-
ity of obtained specialisation positions shortly after graduation may be fairly low,
considering the further careers of physicians (see for example Gjerberg, 2002;
Goldacre & Lambert, 2000), the analysis of (human capital) factors affecting the
attainment of a higher ranked position shortly after graduation is of interesting
value on its own. Starting positions after graduation are influential for later
labour market outcomes (see e.g., van den Berg et al., 2002), and although physi-
cians do not choose their specialisation solely based on the expected income,
economic incentives are found to play a significant role in their choice processes
(Thornton, 2000; Quinn & Price, 1998).
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Appendix 4  
Effects of competence levels at the start on competence levels at the end of 
medical education
The effects of start-level competence indicators on end-level competence indica-
tors are tested by linear regression analyses; for the Progress Test scores at the end
of the fourth year, and for the Skills Test scores of the fourth year. The results are
presented in table II.
As can be seen from table 2, higher GPA’s have a positive effect on both compe-
tence indicators at the end of education. Higher first Progress Test scores of the
first year have a positive effect on the final Progress Test scores of the fourth
year, but not on the Skills Test scores of the fourth year. Taking the type of
instrument (general versus specific medical knowledge and skills) into account,
our first assumed relation seems confirmed; the competence level just before or
at the start of medical education affects the level of competence at the end of
medical education. This means: differentiation in the competence levels at the
end of medical education is indeed partly predicted by the differences in start
levels of the students. And apparently, the types of competence that are
measured by Progress tests and Skills tests are much more different than both of
them differ from the competence that is already measured by GPA’s. This is
suggested by the descriptives (correlations) in table 1 of the results in the paper
as well.
Table II Regression estimates of the effects of competence indicators at the start 
of medical education on competence indicators at the end of medical education
Final Progress Test
fourth year
Skills Test
fourth year
B s.e. B s.e.
Constant 0,261*** 0,075 0,129* 0,078
Competence level start medical education
GPA’s 0,315*** 0,039 0,196*** 0,041
First Progress Test score 1st year 0,415*** 0,144 0,189 0,149
Model Statistics
Number of cases (n) 573 573
Adj.R2 0,120 0,041
F 40,135 13,343
P 0,000 0,000
Note: standardized values are used for all variables
* significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05 and *** significant at 0.01.

